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WASHINGTON'S PARTIAL REJECTION AND
MODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW RULE OF
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Cornelius J. Peck*
Across the nation insurance companies and consumers of insurance have
undertaken to dismantle a substantial portion of tort law developed by the
judiciary. In 1986 they enjoyed considerable success in state legislatures1
and continued to work at the federal level.2 In Washington, those forces
probably accomplished more of their program than in any other state. 3 The
most important change made in Washington tort law is the partial but
comprehensive rejection and modification of the common law rule that
concurrent tortfeasors have a joint and several liability for the harm they
have caused. The change has this significance because it will affect litiga-
tion, settlement of claims short of trial, and the process by which a tort
victim goes about obtaining compensation for injuries suffered. It assures
that in many situations tort victims will not receive full compensation for
*Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. Wall St. ., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
2. During the last year there was a sustained effort to obtain passage of the Products Liability
Reform Act, S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The bill would have preempted state law, established
an expedited settlement procedure with a $100,000 cap on dignitary losses. If a claimant rejected a
settlement offer, liability for non-economic losses would be limited to $250,000. The bill was
withdrawn from further consideration in the session on September 25, 1986. 132 CONG. REc. 13,709-11
(1986).
3. The statute, 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, altered the physician-patient privilege to the benefit of
defendants, provided for review of the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, established a formula for
capping non-economic damages within a range of $120,000 to $580,000, rejected and modified the
common law rule of joint and several liability, established a statute of limitation for malpractice cases
which may bar suits for injuries suffered by minors before they have reached majority, and established a
procedure for structured awards or periodic payments of future economic damages in excess of
$ 100,000. It also made a number of specific changes with respect to the concept that violation of a safety
statute is negligence per se, liabilities to persons whose intoxication or use of drugs contributed to their
injuries, and to persons who are killed while engaged in the commission of a felony. Surprisingly, the
statute does not eliminate the collateral source rule in determining damages. Perhaps it was believed that
an attempt to do so would have raised questions of whether this legislation was protective of the
insurance industry rather than the public. The collateral source was noted as a possible subject for
reform in a notebook distributed to all members of the Senate. See, e.g., Trolin, Controlling Liability
Insurance Costs: State Action and Future Initiatives in the Area of Civil Justice Reform, reprinted in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LEGISLATURES, RESOLVING MHE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS: STATE LEGIs-
LATivE AcTwrEs IN 1986 (1986) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE]; Proffer, Tort Liability Litiga-
tion, reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra, at 4.
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those injuries judged either by the former standards for determining
damages or even by the less generous standards established by the 1986
legislation.
The Washington Legislature acted largely in response to, and un-
critically accepted, the proposals of an organization known as the Liability
Reform Coalition. The coalition included insurance companies (including
an insurance group set up by medical doctors in 1982) and insurance
consumers, such as architects, engineers, dentists, truck drivers, and day
care operators. Representatives of municipal and county governments were
also prominent in the coalition's activities. Complaints that day-care nurs-
eries could no longer continue to operate, that in rural counties all physi-
cians were refusing to deliver babies, that trucking companies were shut-
ting down for lack of insurance, that huge sums had been awarded for
ridiculous product liability cases, and that lawyers were unconscionably
pocketing enormous contingent fees persuaded legislators that something
drastic had to be done. The persuasive power of the coalition was awesome,
and its proposals moved through the legislative chambers, overcoming all
obstacles with a force seldom, if ever, previously displayed in the Washing-
ton Legislature.
4
The stated purpose of the legislation was to make insurance affordable
and available. 5 This was to be accomplished by substantive changes in tort
law that would reduce the losses experienced by insurance companies
which had forced them to raise the rates for liability insurance. 6 It appears,
however, that the chief cause of the insurance crisis (a sharp increase in
premiums charged) was that in the late 1970s and early 1980s interest rates
had risen to such a level that insurance companies wrote policies at rates
lower than sufficient to cover predictable losses. They did so to obtain funds
for investment at the then prevailing high interest rates. When interest rates
dropped, the companies found themselves without sufficient reserves, an
inadequate premium structure, and hence a need for drastic increases in
premiums charged.7 If one assumes that developments in tort law had in
fact contributed the insurance crisis, it is most unlikely that a rlile as old as
the common law rule ofjoint and several liability could by itself have been a
4. See Tang, The Insurance Crisis Induces a Legislative Panic, The Weekly (Seattle), May 14-20,
1986, at 29, col. 1. Opponents made efforts to ameliorate the changes made by the coalition bill,
presenting arguments against the proposed changes. On most issues there was no debate in either house.
A spokesperson for the coalition stated no more than that a proposed amendment to the coalition's bill
should be voted down and its amendment was rejected.
5. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, §100.
6. See, e.g., Trolin, supra note 3.
7. A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE FROM THE JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AVAILABILITY
AND AFFORDABILITY 2, 3, 8 (1985) (Dick Marquardt, Chairman) (on file at the University of Washington
Law Library). A copy of the report was included in a notebook distributed to all members of the Senate.
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cause of the crisis. If the rule played an operative role it would have to have
been in conjunction with other recent changes in tort law.
In this discussion of the 1986 rejection and modification of the joint and
several liability rule, an abbreviated account of that rule's operation prior to
the statute's enactment is followed by an analysis of how the adoption of
comparative negligence provided the basis for a successful attack on joint
and several liability. Comparable developments in other states will be
reviewed. Attention will then be given to the provision in the Washington
statute which requires allocating fault to an "entity" even though that
"entity" has not been, or cannot be, joined as a defendant, reducing the
recoveries of plaintiffs who are not at fault in the slightest degree. Plaintiffs
who are partially at fault may have to pursue several defendants to obtain
compensation, and that compensation similarly be reduced by allocating
fault to non-joined entities. Allocating fault to parents or spouses will
produce what were probably uncontemplated results and complications.
Negotiating settlements in tort cases will be drastically affected and involve
parties who would not have been sued or retained in litigation under prior
standards. The statute will encourage litigating third party tort claims of
injured workers and result in a worsened experience rating for employers
and higher losses for self insurers under workers compensation. The
conclusion is that the statute requires redrafting and amendment even if its
objectives remain acceptable after disclosing what must have been uncon-
templated consequences.
I. COMMON LAW LIABILITY
A. Joint and Several Liability
There was, at common law, a joint liability of tortfeasors who acted in
concert, or with a common purpose and design. Ordinarily, such torts were
intentional torts, frequently criminal in nature, and involved some sort of
combination or conspiracy.8 Torts of that sort have had very little to do with
the insurance crisis or a belief that tort law had become too expensive.
The joint and several liability of concurrent and successive tortfeasors
finds more frequent application and hence is of greater importance to those
undertaking a reform of tort law. Tortfeasors acting independently whose
conduct concurred and caused an indivisible injury had a joint and several
liability. The injury was considered indivisible because there was no basis
for allocating responsibility on the basis of causation, and no other method
of allocation appeared to be rational. 9 Each tortfeasor was in fact a cause of
8. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 322-24 (5th ed. 1984).
9. Id. at 345,347.
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the harm. Therefore, both or all of the concurrent tortfeasors were held
liable for the entire harm done. The same reasoning applied to tortfeasors
who had successively injured a plaintiff if there was no basis for allocating
the harm done and the injuries were therefore considered indivisible.
Doubts would not be resolved in favor of a wrongdoer. However, if a
reasonable ground existed for identification of separate injuries or the
portions of a single injury caused by tortfeasors, the damages would be
considered capable of apportionment and the liability would not be joint. 10
On the other hand, where there were successive injuries capable of being
apportioned but the first tortfeasor placed the plaintiff in the peril of the
second injury, the first tortfeasor was held liable for all of the injuries
because he had caused them. "1
Although concurrent or successive tortfeasors had a joint and several
liability to a party they had injured, that party was entitled only to compen-
sation for the full amount of the harm suffered; double or multiple recov-
eries of damages were not permitted. The injured party was not, however,
required to bring suit against all of the tortfeasors whose conduct was a
cause of the injury, but might instead proceed against the tortfeasor who
seemed most exposed to liability or most capable of responding to and
satisfying a judgment.
The rule of joint and several liability developed when the common law
rule was that contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff was a
complete bar to recovery. The slightest amount of fault on the part of the
plaintiff created such a bar. Conceptually, the question was whether a
totally innocent plaintiff should be permitted to recover the full amount of
his or her damages from a wrongdoer whose conduct had concurred with
that of another wrongdoer to produce a single and indivisible injury or
causally unallocable harm. For most persons that question was easily
answered in the affirmative. This was true even though there was a wide-
spread belief that the governing rule, applied by jurors, lawyers settling
cases, and insurance adjusters was a comparative negligence rule, by
which a plaintiff's recovery was reduced in proportion to his or her degree
of fault. Even judges gave tacit approval to the comparative rule by sending
cases clearly involving contributory negligence to the jury. 12
The rule of joint and several liability permitted a plaintiff to impose the
entire burden of compensation upon one of a number of tortfeasors. This
occurred with some frequency because, as mentioned above, the plaintiff
would elect to obtain satisfaction of judgment from the tortfeasor with the
10. Id. at 348-49.
11. Id. at 352.
12 Id. at 455-56; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 6-7 (2d ed. 1986); Peck, Comparative
Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REv. 689, 727 (1960).
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greatest financial ability to respond, avoiding the difficulties of collection
which might be encountered in pursuing other of the jointly and severally
liable tortfeasors. At the common law, contribution was not allowed be-
tween joint tortfeasors even though they had not acted in concert or with the
intention of injuring the plaintiff. The denial of contribution between
tortfeasors was subjected to substantial criticism, and in the last fifty years
most states adopted statutes which permitted contribution in one form or
another. 13 The right to contribution was established in Washington in 1981
by statute. 14 The basis for contribution between tortfeasors in Washington
was their comparative fault.
B. The Impact of Comparative Negligence
The common law rule that contributory negligence was a complete bar to
recovery was likewise subjected to severe criticism. That rule has now been
replaced in a majority of jurisdictions by a comparative negligence rule.
Comparative negligence has been adopted in various formulations, all of
which permit a plaintiff partially at fault to recover damages, appropriately
reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's fault. In Washington, comparative
negligence was adopted in 1973.15 The Washington Legislature adopted
the "pure" form of comparative negligence, which permits a plaintiff to
recover some damages even though his fault is greater than that of the
defendant or defendants from whom recovery is sought. Other forms of
comparative negligence permit recovery only when the plaintiff's fault is
less than, or not greater than, the fault of the defendant or defendants. 16
The major purpose of adopting a comparative negligence rule was to
avoid the harshness of the contributory negligence rule, which, if strictly
applied by the trier of fact, completely barred any recovery by an injured
party if that party was in any respect responsible for the accident which
caused the injuries. The adoption may be viewed as a change of law made to
facilitate recoveries by injured parties, thereby serving the compensatory
function of tort law. Fairly soon after the legislature adopted comparative
negligence it was argued that the adoption should result in abandonment of
the rule of joint and several liability. The Washington Supreme Court
rejected the argument, refusing to complicate the problems of plaintiffs in
obtaining full recovery of damages. 17 The court would not allow the
13. W. PROSSER & P. KEEmN, supra note 8, at 338.
14. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, §§ 12-14, codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040-.060 (1987).
15. 1973 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 138, codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.015
(1987).
16. V. ScHwARTz, supra note 12, at 45-76.
17. Seattle Fi'st Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230,236,588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
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compensatory function of the law of torts to be compromised by a change in
law designed to support that function.
Ironically, it has nevertheless been the adoption of comparative negli-
gence which provided the arguments which persuaded the legislature to
partially reject and modify the common law rule of joint and several
liability for concurrent tortfeasors. In many cases a plaintiff not at fault-
guilty of no contributory negligence-will be worse off than under the
contributory negligence rule. Indeed, as mentioned above, the rejection of
joint and several liability assures that in a number of situations an injured
party will be unable to obtain full compensation for harm caused by several
tortfeasors.
The basic argument for abandoning the rule of joint and several liability
is that if a plaintiff may recover despite fault, suffering only a diminishment
of recovery in proportion to that fault, it is unjust to impose on a tortfeasor a
liability greater than the proportionate fault of the tortfeasor whose wrong-
doing combined with the conduct of the plaintiff and other parties to cause
the harm. In other words, responsibility for harm done should be dis-
tributed in proportion to the fault of all of the parties involved and not
governed by concepts of causation.
The argument against joint and several liability is reinforced under a
comparative negligence rule when the entire liability for harm caused is
imposed upon a tortfeasor whose financial responsibility and ability to pay
makes it an ideal or target defendant even though its proportionate fault may
be much less than that of other tortfeasors who also caused the harm. For
example, it has become quite common in automobile accident litigation in
which the damages will exceed the policy limits of the drivers involved to
charge the government responsible for the roadway-municipality, county,
or state-with fault in the design or maintenance of the roadway. If the
governmental body is found to have been at fault, under joint and several
liability it will be liable for all of the damages suffered by the plaintiff even
though its proportionate fault might be assessed at as little as ten percent or
less. For example, an intoxicated or careless driver permits his vehicle to
cross the traffic lane divider, causing a head-on collision and multiple
deaths. It is charged that proper design required a physical barrier to
separate the lanes of traffic, or that it was negligent to use a reversible lane
without more adequate warnings. 18 The argument against joint and several
liability becomes even stronger if full recovery is permitted from such a
target defendant by a plaintiff whose proportionate fault was greater than
the fault of the target defendant.
18. See Vasey v. Snohomish County, 44 Wn. App. 83, 721 P.2d 524 (1986) (county 20% liable to
wife of driver whose negligence was 80% of the total negligence).
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The Supreme Court of California was presented with these arguments in
a case challenging the validity of the rule of joint and several liability when
comparative negligence governs the right of a plaintiff to recover. 19 The
court found the arguments to be unpersuasive. The court pointed out that
abandonment of the rule would affect the rights of plaintiffs who had not
been contributorily negligent. Even negligent plaintiffs were not wrong-
doers as were the defendant tortfeasors. A negligent plaintiff was guilty
only of a failure to use due care with respect to himself rather than a lack of
care with respect to others. Moreover, a harm caused by several concurrent
tortfeasors remained an indivisible harm of which each was a cause; each
had caused the entire harm and not merely a portion of it.
The California Supreme Court's views were not persuasive in the Wash-
ington Legislature. The sympathy of the legislators apparently shifted to
defendants who might be held liable for more than their share of the
damages apportioned on the basis of fault. The legislator's concern was not
met by observing that Washington law permitted contribution between
tortfeasors on the basis of comparative fault.20 When contribution is per-
mitted, the question becomes one of whether the defendant from whom the
plaintiff receives payment should have the burden of attaching liability to
other tortfeasors, and bearing the risk that insolvency or unavailability will
preclude recovery from other wrongdoers. The legislative decision was
that, in Washington, that burden and that risk should rest on a plaintiff who
is at fault in any degree.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER STATES
The arguments against joint and several liability have found support not
only in Washington. Changes in the rule were made in at least twelve other
states during 1986.21 Changes had been made in other states at earlier
dates. Thus joint and several liability has been totally abolished in
19. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182 (1978). The analysis of the Supreme Court of California was accepted by the Supreme Court of
Washington in Seattle First National Bank v. Shorline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230, 237 (1978).
20. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1986).
21. Wall St. J., August 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
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Colorado, 22 Indiana, 23 New Hampshire, 24 New Mexico, 25 Ohio,26
Oklahoma, 27 Wyoming,2 8 and Utah. 29 It was abolished in Connecticut with
an exception permitting reallocation of liability on the plaintiff's motion if
within one year the court determines that a defendant's allocated share of
liability is uncollectible. 30 Joint and several liability was abolished for cases
in which the defendant was less than twenty-five percent at fault in Illi-
nois. 31 A similar limitation on recovery of non-economic damages was
made in Hawaii. 32 In West Virginia, joint and several liability has been
abolished in suits against municipalities and political subdivisions for
defendants who bear less than twenty-five percent of the negligence attrib-
utable to all defendants. 33 In Michigan, joint and several liability was
eliminated with exceptions preserving it for cases in which the plaintiff is
not at fault and products liability cases. 34 In Alaska joint and several
liability was preserved with an exception that a party who is allocated less
than fifty percent of the total fault may not be jointly and severally liable for
more than twice that percentage of fault. 35 Joint and several liability for
22. COLO. REV. STAT. §13.211.5 (1986), amended by 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws chs. 107, 108.
23. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5(b) (Bums 1986), amended by P.L. 317-1983, 5 sec. 1, P.L.
174-1984, sec. 3 (effective January 1, 1985).
24. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983 & Supp. 1986). In New Hampshire joint and several
liability remains the rule except when a judgment is entered against two or more defendants. Thus,
where a plaintiff settled with one defendant before trial and then sued another the court held that the
remaining defendant was not entitled to implead the settling defendant for the purpose of obtaining an
apportionment of damages. Minoy v. Proulz, 113 N.H. 698, 313 A.2d. 723 (1973).
25. In Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 694 P.2d 1234 (1981), the Supreme Court of New Mexico
judicially adopted a system of pure comparative negligence. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding
Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336,648 P.2d 794 (1982), the New Mexico
Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that legislative adoption of comparative negligence required
the abandonment of the common law rule of joint and several liability. In Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103
N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985), the Supreme Court of New Mexico apparently gave its approval to the
decision of the court of appeals in Bartlett, holding that third party practice was preserved despite the
absence of joint and several liability of tortfeasors.
26. OHIo REv. CODEANN. § 2315.19(2) (Page 1981 &Supp. 1985). Thepercentagesofliabilityofthe
defendants is, however, determined on the basis of the fault of persons from whom recovery is sought.
27. Joint and several liability was abolished judicially in Oklahoma on the basis that it was not
consistent with the adoption of a comparative negligence statute. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071
(Okla. 1978).
28. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24.
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1953), amended by 1986 Utah Laws S.B. 64, § 2.
30. 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act. 86-338 § 3(c) (West).
31. 1986 11. Legis Serv. P.A. 84-1431, art. 5 (West) (adding § 2-1117 to the Illinois Practice Code).
Joint and several liability is preserved for all past and future medical expenses.
32. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 663(3) (1968), amended by 1986 Hawaii Sess. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. 1986
S.B. No. 51-86, § 17.
33. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7 (1986), amended by 1986 W. Va. Acts, Ist Ex. Sess., ch. 24.
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 6304 (1970), amended by 1986 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 178 (West).
35. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (1983 & Supp. 1986), amended by 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
139.
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non-economic damages was abolished in California. 36 Joint and several
liability for non-economic damages was limited in New York to cases in
which the defendant was more than fifty percent at fault.37 In Florida, joint
and several liability was abolished for non-economic damages and retained
for economic loss only where defendant's fault equals or exceeds that of the
plaintiff.
38
Other formulations of rejection of joint and several liability have been
adopted. In Iowa, joint and several liability has been eliminated for defen-
dants with less than fifty percent of the total fault.
39 In Louisiana, n°
Nevada, 41 and Texas42 joint and several liability has been eliminated when
the defendant's fault is less than the plaintiff's. A similar though lesser
limitation upon joint and several liability is created by comparative negli-
gence laws which permit recovery only against a defendant or group of
defendants whose fault exceeds or equals that of the plaintiff. Such a
limitation exists in Hawaii, 43 Pennsylvania, 4
4 and Minnesota. 45
In most of the states abolishing joint and several liability, the total
liability is divided among the parties to the lawsuit, resulting in a sharing
between the named defendants of the plaintiff's damages, less the alloca-
tion, if any, to the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's fault. The departure
from joint and several liability has much more severe consequences for a
plaintiff under the Washington statute. The Washington statute not only
permits allocation of fault to entities which have an immunity but also to
entities which have not been joined as parties to the lawsuit.46 A defen-
dant's liability is therefore limited to his or its share of the total fault, the
total including the fault of entities which are not parties to the lawsuit. That
36. Proposition 51, 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. xxxi (West).
37. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1601 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987), amendedby 1986 N.Y. Laws ch.
682, § 16.
38. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1986), amended by 1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-160.
39. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1950 & Supp. 1987), amended by 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1293,
§ 4.
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1961 & Supp. 1987), amended by 1980 La. Acts No. 431,
§ I (effective August 1, 1980).
41. NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.191(3) (1967 &Supp. 1986).
42. 'Ex. CIV. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (Vernon 1986), amended by 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7106
(Vernon).
43. HAwAii REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1986).
44. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1986). Joint and several liability is
preserved against any defendant against whom plaintiff's claim is not barred.
45. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1947 & Supp. 1987). In Minnesota a plaintiff's claim was
not barred after 1978 if plaintiff's fault was not greater than that of the defendant. Prior to that date a
plaintiff's fault had to be less than that of a defendant to permit recovery under the Minnesota
comparative negligence statute. See Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 196 Minn. 242,207 N.W.
2d 706 (1973).
46. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401(1). The statute directs the trier of fact to determine the
percentage of total fault attributable to "every entity" which caused a plaintiff's damage.
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share may be considerably less than what it would have been if plaintiffs
damages were shared between the defendants who were parties in the
lawsuit.
The Colorado statute does expressly permit assignment of fault to a non-
party, but limits that assignment to cases in which the defending party gives
notice that a non-party was wholly or partially at fault within ninety days
following commencement of an action. The notice is required to set forth
the non-party's name and last known address, or the best identification of
such non-party as is possible under the circumstances. 47 The Indiana
statute permits a defendant to assert as a defense that the plaintiff's
damages were caused in full or in part by a non-party, bearing the burden of
proof of that defense, provided the assertion is made as part of an answer
filed more than forty-five days prior to the running of the statute of
limitations on a claim against that non-party.48 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma has held that the negligence of tortfeasors who are not parties to
the lawsuit-"ghost tortfeasors"-should be considered by the jury to
make a proper apportionment of the negligence of the parties. 49 A similar
conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in
permitting the assignment of seventy percent of the fault of an automobile
accident to a "phantom car" which left the scene without identification. 50
III. THE WASHINGTON STATUTE
Section 401 of the 1986 Act is the provision rejecting and modifying the
common law rule of joint and several liability. It reads as follows:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 401. A new section is added to chapter 4.22 RCW
to read as follows:
(1) In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the trier of fact
shall determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every
entity which caused the claimant's damages, including the claimant or person
suffering personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants, third-
party defendants, entities released by the claimant, entities immune from
liability to the claimant and entities with any other individual defense against
the claimant. Judgment shall be entered against each defendant except those
who have been released by the claimant or are immune from liability to the
claimant or have prevailed on any other individual defense against the
claimant in an amount which represents that party's proportionate share of the
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.21.111.5(3) (1986).
48. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10 (Burns 1986).
49. Gaither ex rel. Chalfin v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026 (Okla. 1983); see also Paul v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1981).
50. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (1982).
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claimant's total damages. The liability of each defendant shall be several only
and shall not be joint except:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for
payment of the proportionate share of another party where both were acting in
concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party suffering bodily
injury or incurring property damages was not at fault, the defendants against
whom judgment is entered shall be jointly and severally liable for the sum of
their proportionate shares of the claimants [sic] total damages.
(2) If a defendant is jointly and severally liable under one of the exceptions
listed in subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section, such defendant's rights to
contribution against another jointly and severally liable defendant, and the
effect of settlement by either such defendant, shall be determined under RCW
4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060.
(3)(a) Nothing in this section affects any cause of action relating to
hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste disposal sites.
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect a cause of action arising from the
tortious interference with contracts or business relations.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect any cause of action arising from the
manufacture or marketing of a fungible product in a generic form which
contains no clearly identifiable shape, color, or marking.
A. Allocation to "Entities"
Despite the importance of what is an "entity" in this section of the 1986
Tort Reform Act, the statute does not contain a definition of "entity." It is
apparent from the words used that the term means more than defendant and
also more than potential defendants with a defense to liability to the
plaintiff. It will include employers with an immunity from suit by injured
employees, parents with a defense to suit by children, spouses, and uniden-
tified persons, bodies, and associations. Apparently, although the lack of a
definition makes it less than certain, an "entity" must be a juridicial being
capable of fault, and does not include inanimate objects or forces of nature.
Section 401(b) of the Washington statute preserves joint and several
liability in those cases in which a plaintiff is not at fault, but that liability is
limited to the sum of the proportionate shares of fault of the defendants
against whom judgment is entered. It does not. include the fault of a
defendant or entity released by a plaintiff. Joint and several liability is
abolished if a plaintiff is at fault, and apparently any fault is sufficient to
243
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deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the limited joint and several liability
preserved under the Act. Defendants will not be liable for damages alloca-
ble to the fault of "entities" dismissed from the suit because of an immunity
or the fault of an "entity" which was not or could not be joined as a
defendant in the proceeding.51 Nor, pursuant to express statutory provision,
will defendants against whom a judgment has been entered be liable for any
share of the fault and damages allocable to a defendant who prevailed on
any individual defense. The provision for allocation of fault to "entities"
will have results which may not have been anticipated by legislators and
sponsors of the legislation.
A major concern of the proponents of the 1986 Act was to reduce the
liabilities of third parties whose conduct tortiously injured an employee in
the course of his employment. The typical case is one in which it is alleged
that the machinery or other equipment used by the employee at the time of
the injury was defective in some respect. Under the Washington workers'
compensation law, the employer, even though also at fault in causing the
employee's injury, has an immunity from tort liability to the employee.
52
Workers' compensation benefits frequently fail to give an injured employee
full compensation for the injury suffered. Consequently, the employee
brings a "third-party tort action" against the machinery or equipment
manufacturer. The amount recoverable by the employee in that lawsuit may
substantially exceed the worker's compensation benefits because the third-
party tort action permits full recovery for a loss of earning capacity and
recovery for non-economic losses, such as pain and suffering. Third-party
defendants held liable to the employee previously sought to shift part of that
liability to the employer, but the employer's immunity from liability to the
employee was held to insulate the employer from a claim for indemnity or
contribution by the manufacturer. 53 The 1986 Act changed that situation by
providing that a share of fault may be allocated to an "entity" even though
51. An argument that an allocation of fault cannot be made to a non-party could be made from the
last paragraph of RCW § 4.22.015, which provides what is apparently the definition of fault for the
purposes of the 1986 statute. That paragraph, which predates the 1986 statute, reads: "A comparison of
fault for any purpose under RCW 4.22.005 through 4.22.060 shall involve consideration of both the
nature of the conduct of the parties to the action and the extent of the causal relation between such
conduct and the damages." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1986) (emphasis added).
The argument is overidden by the express language of § 401 which requires the trier of fact to
determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the
plaintiff's damages and to enter judgment against each defendant for that party's proportionate share of
the plaintiff's total damages.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1985).
53. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230,588 P.2d 1308 (1978). Nor
did the negligence of the employer reduce the amount of the lien of the Department of Labor and
Industries or a self-insurer on the claim of the employee against the third party defendant. Kelley v.
Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).
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that "entity" was immune from liability to a plaintiff. The consequence
was to reduce the liability of the manufacturer and, of course, the recovery
by the injured worker.
Although the primary purpose of the provision permitting allocation of
fault to an entity with immunity was to provide relief for defendants in
workers' compensation third party tort actions, the provision was not
limited in its application to those cases. It will instead be applicable to any
other "entity" which has an immunity from tort liability to the plaintiff.
Parents, for example, have a general immunity from liability to their
children for failure properly to instruct them and supervise their activi-
ties.54 Nevertheless, recently in suits brought for injuries suffered by
minors, defendants have unsuccessfully attempted, relying upon the com-
parative negligence law, to obtain contribution or indemnity from the
parents55 or otherwise limit their liability to the child. 56 It may therefore be
expected that in future suits brought by minors for injuries suffered,
defendants will attempt to allocate fault to their parents despite the parental
immunity because such an allocation will reduce the defendants' liability to
a minor by the share of the minor's total damages allocated to the parent.
This could occur even in cases in which the minor is totally without fault
unless the parents are joined as defendants because the joint and several
liability in such a case is limited to the sum of the proportionate shares of
the defendants against whom judgment is entered.
In cases in which the minor is without fault parents may be sued with an
understanding that they will not plead their immunity. Not pleading immu-
nity would, of course, permit a judgment for a larger amount against the
other defendants. In that event, the defendants should not be able to have
the parents dismissed from the suit on jurisdictional grounds because of
their immunity, but it will probably be argued that a defendant's statutory
right to name other entities for the purpose of limiting liability created a
substantive right to have the parents dismissed from the suit prior to the
entry of judgment. If the parents are not dismissed, the prior case law
54. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 105 Wn. 2d 118, 712 P.2d 293 (1986); Talarico v. Foremost Ins.
Co., 105 Wn. 2d 114,712 P.2d 294 (1986); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. 1,105 Wn. 2d
99, 713 P.2d 79 (1986); Chuth v. George, 43 Wn. App. 640, 719 P.2d 562 (1986). As stated in these
cases, parents do have a tort liability to their children for wanton and willful misconduct, and it has been
held that a child may recover from his parent for injuries caused by the parent's negligent driving.
Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980); see also Note, Torts-Parental Immunity, 56
WASH. L. Rev. 319 (1981).
55. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., I05 Wn. 2d 119, 712 P.2d 293 (1986). A similar attempt produced
the decision of the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), in which the court held that joint and several liability
was neither abolished nor limited by its earlier decision to adopt a pure comparative negligence rule.
See supra note 19.
56. Jenkins, 105 Wn. 2d at 103-06, 713 P.2d at 82-84.
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establishes that the paying defendant will not be entitled to contribution
from the parents.
57
If allocations of fault to parents reduce the recoveries obtained by
minors, the consequences will be different only in degree from those under
the "barbarous rule" 58 of the common law by which the negligence of the
parents was imputed to a child for the purpose of barring recovery under the
contributory negligence rule. That rule was rejected by the Washington
court long ago when the court stated that both the ethical basis for imputing
negligence and sound authority sustained the view that the parent's negli-
gence was not a defense to an action by a child for injuries suffered. 59 These
consequences would also conflict with a statutory prohibition, to be dis-
cussed, against imputing the parent's negligence to a child.
The provision in section 401 (1) for allocation of fault to an "entity" will
permit a similar reduction in the recovery of an injured person if his or her
spouse was one of the causes of the injuries. A spouse will be an "entity" to
whom a share of fault in causing the accident can be allocated, and such an
allocation will reduce the liability allocated to named defendants. There is
no longer a general inter-spousal immunity from tort liability, 60 but
spouses ordinarily do not sue one another unless there is insurance which
will cover the defendant spouse. If the injured spouse was in any respect
negligent (as might be expected, for example, with respect to accidents in
the home by "do-it-yourself" couples working on a project) the loss to the
family unit of attributing fault to the other spouse will be proportionately
the same as if the negligence of that other spouse had been imputed to the
injured spouse. Thus if the uninjured spouse was responsible for thirty or
forty percent of the total fault, the liability of the other defendants will be
reduced by thirty or forty percent.
That this result is predictable under the 1986 Act is surprising in light of
recent legislative actions ensuring that the negligence of one spouse is not
imputed to the other spouse. A rule requiring imputation had been judi-
cially adopted at an early date because of a concern that under Washington
community property law a negligent spouse might benefit from his or her
own wrongdoing through a recovery by the community. 61 In 1973 the
legislature included in the comparative negligence act a provision stating:
57. See supra note 54.
58. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 8, at 531-32.
59. Gregg v. King County, 80 Wash. 196, 204, 141 P. 340, 344 (1914).
60. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). A plaintiff spouse may recover from the
other all damages as separate property except for one half of the damages for lost earning capacity. See
Vasey v. Snohomish County, 44 Wn. App. 83, 92-93, 721 P.2d 524, 529 (1986).
61. Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland E. R.R., 107 Wash. 678, 102 P.2d 630 (1919). It had earlier been
held that a recovery by an injured spouse was community property. Hawkins v. Front-St. Cable Ry.. 3
Wash. 592, 28 P. 1021 (1892).
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The negligence of one marital spouse shall not be imputed to the other spouse
to the marriage so as to bar recovery in an action by the other spouse to the
marriage, or his or her legal representative, to recover damages from a third
party caused by negligence resulting in death or injury to the person.
62
In 1981 the Legislature enacted a tort reform act which rephrased the
provision to read:
The contributory fault of one spouse shall not be imputed to the other spouse
or the minor child of the spouse to diminish recovery in an action by the other
spouse or the minor child of the spouse, or his or her legal representative, to
recover damages caused by the fault resulting in death or in injury to the
person or property, whether separate or community, of the spouse. In an
action brought for wrongful death, the contributory fault of the decedent shall
be imputed to the claimant in that action.
63
The effect of these statutes upon a spouse's right to recover damages has
not been established by the supreme court. The court of appeals has ruled
that the prohibition against imputing negligence of one spouse to the other
requires that a wife's claim for loss of consortium not be reduced because of
her husband's contributory negligence in causing the accident which re-
sulted in his incapacity. 64 The loss of consortium claim was viewed as
separate and not derivative from any claim her husband might have had.
The supreme court has characterized damages for pain and suffering as the
separate property of an injured spouse, 65 from which it follows that negli-
gence of the other spouse should not be imputed to reduce damages for pain
and suffering. 66 These claims could be reduced, however, as indicated
above, by an allocation of fault to the other spouse if the liability of the
defendants is several and notjoint. What effect the 1986 statute will have on
other elements of an injured spouse's claim for damages would appear to
turn upon whether those elements are viewed as community or separate. If
they are viewed as community property the fault of one spouse traditionally
would have worked a reduction in the amount recoverable.
The supreme court recently indicated that damages for loss of past
earnings and for loss of future earning capacity will ordinarily be com-
munity property.67 However, in an earlier decision in which the court
abolished interspousal immunity from tort liability68 the court held that an
injured spouse was entitled to recover one half of his or her lost earning
62. 1973 Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess., ch. 138, § 2.
63. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 10 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.020 (1986)).
64. Christie v. Maxwell, 40 Wn. App. 40, 696 P.2d 1256 (1985).
65. Marriage of Brown, 100 Wn. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984).
66. Cf. Vasey v. Snohomish County, 44 Wn. App. 83, 721 P.2d 524 (1986).
67. Brown, 100 Wn. 2d at 729, 675 P.2d at 1207.
68. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
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capacity from the other spouse as separate property. In addition, the
community was entitled to recover past and future medical expenses
because that recovery would inure directly to the benefit of the injured
spouse. This decision recently led the court of appeals to conclude, in a
case arising before the effective date of the 1986 Act, that the statute
prohibiting imputing negligence between spouses requires that an injured
spouse be entitled to recover one half of the damages for lost earning
capacity as separate property. That recovery will not be diminished because
the other spouse's negligence contributed to the injuries. 69 Damages for the
other half of the lost earning capacity was allocated to the other spouse and
reduced by the negligence of that spouse. 70 The court of appeals, following
the lead of the supreme court, also held that there was to be a full recovery
of past and future medical expenses despite the fault of the uninjured spouse
because those damages would inure to the benefit of the injured spouse.
These developments with respect to the prohibition of imputing fault
between spouses and community property suggest interesting possibilities
under the 1986 statute for those cases in which the injured spouse is free
from fault but the other spouse was at fault. The illustrative case is one in
which the injured spouse was a passenger in an automobile which collided
with another through the combined negligence of the other driver and the
driver-spouse. If a plaintiff is free from fault, liability of the defendants is
joint and several for the sum of their proportionate shares of a plaintiff's
total damages. It may, therefore, be advantageous for the injured spouse to
file suit against the negligent spouse as well as the other driver for the
purpose of including the share of the damages of the negligent spouse in the
total for which there is a joint and several liability. Indeed, to do so would
make an even stronger case that the injured spouse was entitled to recover
damages for one-half of the lost earning capacity as separate property
because that would be the relief to which the injured spouse was entitled in
the action against the spouse at fault. Joining the spouse at fault would also
preclude reducing the damages recoverable as separate property for pain
and suffering or loss of consortium which would result from allocating a
share of those damages to the spouse at fault if that spouse were not a party
to the suit. The injured spouse need not seek satisfaction of the judgment
from his or her spouse but may instead proceed to obtain that satisfaction
from some other defendant.
Of course, if the injured spouse does obtain satisfaction from a defendant
other than the spouse at fault, the couple must consider the possibility that
the satisfying defendant will seek contribution from the spouse at fault, as
69. Vasey, 44 Wn. App. at 83, 721 P.2d at 524.
70. Id. at 94-95, 721 P.2d at 530.
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the satisfying defendant is entitled to do under the 1986 statute. 71 If the
couple has substantial community assets the amount lost in paying contri-
bution may equal the gain from avoiding the diminution of an allocation of
fault to the spouse as a non-joined entity. But if the couple does not have
substantial community assets, and if the recovery by the injured spouse is
characterized as separate property in accordance with the court of appeals'
recent decision, the couple will have much to gain from a suit which
includes the spouse at fault as a defendant. The other defendant will not be
able to recover contribution from that part of the recovery obtained by the
injured spouse as separate property, and the negligent spouse may free
future earnings by obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy.
B. Successive Torifeasors
It appears that another uncontemplated change has been made by section
401(1) for cases involving aggravation of injuries by a subsequent
tortfeasor. Subsection 401(1)(a) provides:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for payment
of the proportionate share of another party where both were acting in concert
or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
The subsection appears to be the complete statement of when a party is
responsible for the fault of another, and it does not include liability for
successive injuries. For example, prior to the statute's effective date, a
party who had wrongfully injured a plaintiff and thereby required medical
treatment or hospitalization was liable for the aggravation of the plaintiff's
injuries through the malpractice of a physician or hospital personnel.72 A
party who tortiously injured another and left that person in a position of
peril would be held liable for the aggravation of that person's injuries in a
subsequent accident even though that accident came about because of the
negligence of a third person. 73 That liability did not rest upon the concept of
joint and several liability for harms which cannot be segregated but instead
upon principles of causation. Read literally, section 401(1) would require
determining the proportionate share of total fault for each of the successive
71. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401(2).
72. Yarrough v. Hines, 112 Wash. 310, 192 P. 886 (1920); see Martin v. Cunningham, 93 Wash.
517, 161 P. 355 (1916); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 8, at 309; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 879 illustration 3 (1979); see also Atherton v. Devine, 602 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1979) (holding the
original tortfeasor liable for the aggravation of injuries which occurred when the ambulance transport-
ing the plaintiff to a hospital was involved in another accident).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORrs § 879 (1979); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 8, at
329; cf. Fugere v. Pierce, 5 Wn. App. 592,490 P.2d 132 (1971). But cf. Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398,
220 P. 782 (1923).
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tortfeasors and prohibit joint and several liability for the aggravation of
injuries as not coming within the exception stated in subsection 401 (1)(a).
RCW 4.22.015 of the prior and current law provides a possible escape
from this untoward result of the 1986 Act. The last paragraph of that
section, which defines "fault," provides that a comparison of fault for any
purpose under the provision of the prior law shall involve consideration of
both the nature of the parties conduct and the extent of the causal relation
between such conduct and the damages. If it is read to apply to the 1986
Act, it might permit addition of the subsequent tortfeasor's fault to the fault
of the prior tortfeasor whose conduct created the occasion for the subse-
quent injury and thus increase the liability of the prior tortfeasor.
C. Miscellaneous Problems
Section 401(1)(b) poses other problems. The haphazard interchange of
"person" and "party" has no apparent purpose, and the absence of the
word "entity" is noticeable. Does this mean that only human beings are
"persons" who may act as agents or servants of a party, with a consequence
that there is no agency or respondeat superior liability for the acts of an
"entity"? Is there a reason for distinguishing between responsibility for the
fault of another person and responsibility for payment of the proportionate
share of another party? Is it impossible to act in concert with an "entity"?
The section obviously deserves re-drafting, and until it receives that re-
drafting it will require considerable judicial construction.
Section 401(3) of the 1986 Act establishes three other exceptions from
the rejection of joint and several liability. They are for: (1) any cause of
action relating to hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste disposal
sites; (2) a cause of action arising from the tortious interference with
contracts or business relations; and (3) any cause of action arising from the
manufacture or marketing of a fungible product in a generic form which
contains no clearly identifiable shape, color, or marking.
Once again deficiencies of drafting are apparent. There is no indication
given of the quantity of hazardous wastes or substances required to make
the exception applicable. Does a small amount of a hazardous substance in
a food product render the exception applicable to the grower, the food
processor, the wholesaler, and the restaurant which served the food to the
plaintiff? Does the exception apply only to wastes and substances at a waste
disposal site? How large a quantity of waste must be accumulated to render
the place a waste disposal site? Does the exception apply to wastes held
temporarily at one place for transfer at a later date to another site?
Does the exception for tortious interference apply to all contracts, or
only to commercial and business contracts? For example, does it apply to
250
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an implied provision of confidentiality which arise in the contract between
a physician and patient concerning treatment? If so, then there is joint and
several liability for the physician, insurance investigator, insurance com-
pany, and counsel for the company if an overzealous investigator induces a
breach of confidentiality. Does it apply to inducing a breach of an employ-
ment contract on a ground which violates public policy?74
The exception concerning fungible products in a generic form was
apparently made for cases such as those involving the drug known as DES
75
and the use of asbestos. 76 Of course, a substantial cause of the problem of
proof encountered by plaintiffs in the DES cases was the failure of dispens-
ing pharmacists to maintain accurate records concerning the source of the
drugs used, and some of the drugs were marketed under trade names.
Prefabricated asbestos products frequently bear a trade name or mark. The
exception is, therefore, not well drafted for the problem it addressed and
may well fail to serve its intended purpose with other drugs marketed with
identifying marks but dispensed by pharmacists as was DES. The excep-
tion could also apply to other fungible products, such as nails, screws,
bolts, grain, and lumber.
The creation of these three exceptions will almost certainly be used to
attack the constitutionality of section 401 as a deprivation of equal protec-
tion of the law under both the United States and the Washington Constitu-
tions. Discussions in the Senate of comparable exceptions made by an
earlier draft indicate that the first exception was based upon a concern that
several liability alone would not provide sufficient incentives for large
businesses to participate in the state superfund for cleaning up waste
depositories. 77 The exception for interference with contracts and business
relations was explained as relating to business torts, outside the area of
personal injury, and hence outside the area of concern about the availability
and affordability of casualty insurance. 78 The exception for fungible prod-
ucts marketed in a generic form was explained, as its language suggests, as
an acceptance of the Washington Supreme Court's solution to the problems
caused by DES and the necessity of its enactment if such injuries were to be
74. Cf Cagle v. Bums & Roe, Inc., 106 Wn. 2d 911,726 P.2d 434 (1986); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wn. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
75. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Martin v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 102 Wn. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
76. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-59 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
77. WASHINGTON STATE SENATE, SENATE JOURNAL (March 10, 1986) 27-28 (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge).
78. Id. at 28-29 (remarks of Sens. Talmadge, Bottiger, and Thompson).
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compensated. 79 The actual language of the exceptions appeared in the
"coalition bill" which was substituted in the House for the text of the
Senate bill and ultimately became the 1986 Tort Reform Act. 80 Those
exceptions were not discussed in the House following the substitution. The
legislative history thus provides something of a rationale for adoption of the
exceptions, but it is far from comprehensive in its explanation of why joint
and several liability should be preserved in its entirety only for the three
stated types of lawsuits. Despite the weakness of the support for the
exceptions, an equal protection attack upon them is unlikely to succeed
unless they are subjected to close scrutiny. 81 However, even if a successful
equal protection attack is made, the result is more likely to be an invalida-
tion of the exceptions than an invalidation of section 401.82
D. The Effect on Negotiated Settlements
Section 401 will predictably have unanticipated and undesireable effects
upon the negotiation of settlements in tort cases. Section 401(1) requires
allocating fault to parties who have been released by the plaintiff and
provides for entering judgment against an individual defendant for only that
defendant's share of the plaintiff's total damages (unless, as will be
discussed, the plaintiff was free from fault). A consequence is that a
settlement may produce a greater reduction in a defendant's liability than
the amount paid, and thus a greater reduction in a plaintiff's total recovery,
than was the case under the prior law. Under the prior law, the reduction in
the liability of other tortfeasors, and hence in the remainder to be recovered
by a plaintiff, was only the amount paid in settlement if that amount was
reasonable at the time of settlement. 83 In determining what was a reason-
able settlement, it was permissible to consider the financial capacity of the
released party to pay, expectable expenses of litigation, and the then
perceived merits of the claim and defenses. 84 That amount could be
79. Id. at 29-30 (remarks of Sens. Talmadge and Thompson).
80. WASHINGTON STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE JOURNAL (March 6, 1986) 1056-58.
81. See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice
Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195, 202-10 (1985), reprinted in 35 DEF. L.J. 359, 367-77 (1986). The recent
decision of the Supreme Court of California in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695
P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985), sustaining the constitutionality of
a $250,000 limitation on non-economic losses in medical malpractice cases in response to a perceived
insurance crisis, suggests the acceptability of that rationale for the law and, similarly, its absence as the
reason for recognizing exceptions from a law limiting liabilities.
82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968);
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). But cf Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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considerably less than the settling defendant's proportionate share of
plaintiff's total damages established after trial. Plaintiffs now will be
reluctant to enter into settlements until a determination is made of the
shares of fault allocable to all potential defendants and they will resist
recognizing other factors which previously made a lesser sum acceptable.
Litigation will therefore frequently involve more parties and continue over
a longer period of time than under the former law.
This result is ensured by section 401(1)(b) which recognizes and pre-
serves a joint and several liability in cases in which the plaintiff is without
fault. That joint and several liability is limited to the sum of the proportion-
ate shares of the defendants against whom a judgment is entered. Accord-
ingly, a plaintiff without fault will have incentive to involve and keep as a
defendant every party against whom ajudgment can be entered and to do so
regardless of whether that party will be able to pay the judgment. The
party's limited financial resources will not make acceptable a settlement at
the limit of ability to respond because it will reduce the amount which will
be recoverable from the financially responsible jointly liable defendants.
Settlements in such cases will be less frequent and considerably more
complicated because of the number of parties than they used to be.
Target, or deep pocket, defendants will also have an incentive to hold out
until ajudgment has been rendered. Attributing any fault to the plaintiff in a
judgment will eliminate the possibility of joint and several liability and
limit that defendant's liability to its proportionate share of the total fault. It
will also eliminate any possibility of contribution between tortfeasors. It
seems likely that financially responsible, or target, defendants will negoti-
ate with stiffened resolve to limit their liability to a share until a judgment
has established a plaintiff's freedom from fault. They will be unwilling to
accept liability for a plaintiff's total harm on the chance of obtaining
reimbursement later in a suit for contribution.
This unwillingness will be based in part on the fact that section 401(1)(b)
states, "If the trier of fact determines that the claimant . . . was not at
fault, the defendants against whom judgment is entered shall be jointly and
severally, liable . . . ." This strongly suggests that joint and several
liability exists only after the entry of judgment. Section 401(2) reinforces
this reading by providing a right of contribution only for parties who are
jointly and severally liable under section 401(1), and that section makes it
clear that a judgment is to be entered only against parties who are defen-
dants and not defendants or entities released by a claimant. Section 401(2)
of the 1986 Act does provide that a defendant's right to contribution shall
be determined under the law which governed contribution between
tortfeasors prior to enactment of the 1986 statute. It would, however, be a
tortured reading of that section to conclude that a party is jointly and
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severally liable if an action might have been, even though it has not been,
pursued to judgment.
There is also a problem concerning the effect a settlement at an amount
which exceeds that proportion of a plaintiff's total damages allocated to the
settling party has in a subsequent lawsuit. The law prior to enactment of the
1986 statute85 provided that the claim of a releasing person against other
persons was reduced by the amount paid pursuant to a reasonable settle-
ment agreement. That will probably continue to be the result with respect to
judgments entered for joint and several liability when plaintiffs are free
from fault because the prior law is expressly made applicable by the 1986
statute in such cases. But will it have that effect with respect to defendants
who have only a several liability? Section 401 (1) of the 1986 Act expressly
provides that the judgment shall be entered against each defendant". . in
an amount which represents that party's proportionate share of the claim-
ant's total damages." It does not make provision for reducing the claim-
ant's total damages by any amounts previously received in settlements. The
language is thus susceptible of a reading that a plaintiff who receives an
excessive settlement from a released entity may keep that windfall and need
not give the remaining tortfeasors any credit for the excess.
Finally, it should be noted that section 403 of the 1986 Act amended the
provisions of the workers compensation statute which give the Department
of Labor and Industries and self-insurers a lien upon the recovery of an
injured worker in a third-party tort suit. Section 403 added to RCW
51.24.060 a new subsection (f),86 which provides that if the employer or a
co-employee are determined to have been at fault, the Department or self-
insurer loses its lien on the third-party tort claim recovery. The loss of the
lien is not made proportional to the fault of the employer or co-employee
but instead provides that attribution of any fault to them is sufficient to
destroy the lien in its entirety. The worker then enjoys full worker's
compensation benefits. Those benefits may not be as much as the reduction
of the third-party recovery worked by allocation of fault to the employer,
but their receipt will ameliorate the loss which would otherwise occur.
The new subsection (f) is made applicable by its terms, "If the employer
or a co-employee are determined under section 401 of this 1986 Act to be at
fault." As written, the section appears to require a judicial determination
that the employer or co-employee was at fault and thus precludes eliminat-
ing the Department's lien by a settlement between the employee and the
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1986).
86. The new subsection reads as follows:
(f) Ifthe employer or a co-employee are determined undersection 401 ofthis 1986 act tobe at fault.
(c) and (e) of this subsection do not apply and benefits shall be paid by the department and/or self-
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third-party defendant. The prior workers' compensation law requires an
injured worker to give notice to the Department (or self-insurer) that he has
elected to seek damages from a third person 87 and it also provides that a
compromise or settlement for less than the amount of compensation bene-
fits is void unless made with the written approval of the Department or self-
insurer. 88 However, nothing in the 1986 statute requires the third-party
defendant or the plaintiff to give notice that the employer has been identi-
fied as an "entity" to which fault should be assigned in the litigation, nor is
there any provision made for participation in the litigation by the Depart-
ment or self-insurer. To the contrary, the existing workers' compensation
law specifically prohibits pleadings or evidence that the plaintiff in a third-
party tort suit is entitled to compensation under the law.89 It therefore
appears that the Department or self-insurer may be deprived of its lien
without opportunity to contest the propriety of allocation of fault to the
employer. The loss of the lien will adversely affect the employer's experi-
ence rating, 90 resulting in a higher premium than would otherwise be
applicable. Such a substantial loss without notice and opportunity to
participate by the Department as an employer's representative or a self-
insurer certainly offends the concept of due process of law. The pos-
sibilities for collusion between the injured employee and the third-party
defendant are too obvious to be ignored, but they will exist until the statute
is changed.
The workers' compensation law permits the Department or a self-insurer
to institute suit against a third-party tortfeasor if the injured employee
elects not to proceed against that party. 91 The 1986 statute inexplicably fails
to make provision for loss of the lien in such suits if fault is attributed to the
employer or a co-employee. An incentive has thus been provided for injured
employees to litigate rather than permit the Department to negotiate a
settlement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The section of the 1986 Tort Reform Act which rejects and modifies the
common law rule of joint and several liability is not a well drafted provi-
sion. Even if its apparent objectives are accepted as sound public policy,
the statutory language will cause avoidable litigation and unnecessarily
complicate the process by which tort claims have been settled in the past.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.080 (1985).
88. Id. § 51.24.090.
89. Id. § 51.24.100.
90. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-17-850 (1983).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.050 (1985).
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The changes made include abrupt reversals of policies carefully developed
in past years by both the legislature and the courts, and this creates an
impression that the legislature gave its approval to the new statutory
language without fully understanding the consequences of that approval.
It is a grave and serious matter to permit the reduction of an injured
person's claim for compensation from one who caused the injuries by
allocating fault to unidentified and unreachable entities, and, if that had
been the legislative purpose, one would have hoped it had been done in
language more clearly affirming that purpose. The statute produces an
abrupt reversal of a legislative policy prohibiting imputing negligence
between spouses and between parents and children, and again one might
have hoped for a clearer statement of that purpose if that were the legislative
purpose. One might have hoped that a statute permitting such con-
sequences would have carefully fashioned protective procedures for mak-
ing such allocations, but none appear in the statute. Considering the
importance of the concept of an "entity" to which fault may be allocated,
one might have hoped for a definition of that term, but none was given.
The waiver of sovereign immunity and the adoption of comparative
negligence did create problems for "deep pocket" defendants, such as
municipalities and counties. But those problems could have been dealt
with, as they were in other states, in much less draconian ways. Arguments
made for comparative negligence, advanced to enhance the compensatory
function of tort law, have now produced a situation in which plaintiffs free
from fault are in a worse position that they would have been under the harsh
rule that contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery. A person
subjected to successive injuries by the wrongdoing of a first tortfeasor will
apparently have to join all wrongdoers and litigate each claim against each
wrongdoer in order to obtain a full recovery of damages.
An almost certainly uncontemplated consequence of the 1986 Act is that
it will significantly complicate the process of settling tort claims and
thereby increase the expense of litigation. The inefficiencies of the tort
system for compensating injured persons are derived largely from the
expenses of litigation, and an increase in those expenses will be reflected in
increased insurance premiums, the reduction of which was a major purpose
of the Act. Avoiding this untoward event in negotiating settlements of cases
is alone sufficient reason for prompt legislative reconsideration of the
statute. At the same time, consideration should also be given to whether the
policy objectives of the 1986 Tort Reform Act should be pursued in such a
single-minded manner.
[In a subsequent issue of the Washington Law Review Professor Peck
will discuss constitutional challenges to the 1986 revisions of the rule of
joint and several liability of tortfeasors.]
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